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ur murder laws have been and now are
designed to afford protection against
killing to reasonable creatures. In a
number of states, murder laws are so worded or
so interpreted by the courts that they define
"murder" as the killing of areasonable creature in
being instead of as the killing of a human being.
Even those states which define murder as the
killing of a human being presuppose the impor-
tance of rationality, since their laws have their
roots in the conceptual and legal tradition of
English common law which accepted the Aris-
totelian definition of "man" as "a rational ani-
tnal." Consider for a mornent the following laws
and judicial decisions which still make it quite
evident that the intent of the law is to afford pro-
tection against killing to reasonable creatures, all
of which explicitly reaffirm the common law def-
inition of murder. In Tennessee, the murder law(which is the common law definition in toto)
reads: "If any person of sound memory and dis-
cretion, unlawfully kill any reasonable creature
in being, and under the peace of the state, with
malice aforethought, either express or implied,
such person shall be guilty of murder."l In Mich-
igan, "murder" has been judicially interpreted to
mean: "Murder is where a person of' sound
memory and discretion kills any reasonable crea-
ture in being, in the peace of the state, with mal-
ice aforethought, either expressed or implied."2
In Delaware, the murder law was judicially inter-
preted to cover the following: "Where a person
of sound memory and discretion, unlawfully
kills any reasonable creature in being with malice
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aforethotrght, is guilty of murder."3 In Ir./ew Jer-
se), the corlrts have also explicitly interpreted
murder to be killing a reasonable being with
malice aforethought.a Many other states such as
West Virginia, Vermont, Rhode Island, Pennsyl-
vania, and North Carolina, affirm the common
law definition of murder as the killing of a rea-
sonable creature without explicitly stating the
definition itself.5 Other states have kept the com-
mon lan definition but have inserted "human
being" for "reasonable creature" in the defini-
tion of' "murder," but many of these states
fbrmerlr. had murder laws which were so word-
ed,6 and "human being" still implicitly' involves
rationalin in the definition of "man" as "a ratio-
nal animal." The issues which we wish to raise
concerning reasonableness and murder are thus
relevant to our entire legal tradition, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly.
It has been and still is commonplace to as-
sume nair,ell' that all human beings are reason-
able creatures. It is also assumed that onl)' hu-
man beings are reasonable creatures. These two
propositions are logically independent of' one
another, and their truth is now open to serious
challenge. We propose to develop such a chal-
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Are all reasonable creatures
in being men?
It is 1'et to be determined whether the fram-
ers of those murder laws which explicitly afford
protection against murder to "reasonable crea-
tures" are to be commended for their farsighted-
ness or condemned for their carelessness. Since
this definition of "murder" includes all "reason-
able" creatures and is not limited in its explicit
wording to "human" creatures, it could presum-
ably be applied if at some point in the future one
of our citizens killed with premeditative malice a
"reasonable" visitor from outer space. Since we
are not confronted immediately with such vis-
itors, however, there are problems enough with
respect to the application of the law to current
denizens of our states. ls it murder in Tennessee
(and elsewhere) to kill a chimpanzee?7 In the
past this question has been easily answered in the
negative, for it has seemed so obvious that chim-
panzees are not reasonable creatures. Of course,
we have known all along that they possessed an
acute problem-solving intelligence, brt this
alone has not qualified them for classification as
"reasonable creatures." We have in fact applied a
m.uch stron.ger criterion than the weak one Dar-
win recognized, i.e., possession of an acute prob-
lem-solving intelligence, in excluding them from
the class of'"reasonable creatures." What is this
strong criterion, and does it really apply to chim-
panzees?
The strongest criterion for the correct ap-
plication of the concept of "reasonable" to a liv-
ing being is the ability to use a larrguage mean-
ingfully'. The ability to use "real speech," Des-
cartes claimed, "is the only certain sign of
thought."s Even the potential for doing so is
thought to suffice, for human infants cannot
usuallv do this until around the age of l8 to 24
months; yet we do classify them as "reasonable
beings" and recognize that willfully and mali-
ciouslr killing a small infant who has not yet de-
veloped its potential for using language mean-
ingfulll is murder.
It is not sufficient that a living being merely
be able to "parrot" the sounds of a human lan-
guage for it to be correctly classified as "reason-
able." We do not think that it is murder willfully
to kill parrots, parakeets, mynah birds, talking
bulldogs, etc., for we do not recognize them as
reasonable beings. What they lack, despite their
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ability to imitate human sounds, is (1) the ability
to correlate conventionalized symbols (as op-
posed to natural calls and cries) with their deno-
tated objects and to generalize their usage
beyond the context of their initial introduction,
(2) the ability to combine groups of those sym-
bols into sentences constructed according to con-
ventionalized rules to syntax and to construct
novel meaningful combinations, and (3) the
ability to communicate with other language-users
to make their meanings, intentions, and desires
known and to facilitate symbolic communication
for its own delightful sake or as a means of
achieving their goals or satisfying their intentions
and desires. A.y living thing whrch can learn
and use conventionalized symbols in these three
ways may be correctly said to have the ability to
use a language and to be a reasonable being.
This is not being offered as a minimal definition
of "language," for any creature with such linguis-
tic facilities will be a clear-cut user of language.
or the greater part of human histor/, we
have assumed that only members of the
human species are reasonable beings in
the aforesaid sense. We have known, of course,
that some members of our species do not fulfill
the definition, for there have always been pro-
foundly retarded humans who did nor satisfy
any of our three criteria for language and rea-
sonableness. As late as ten years zgo, this as-
sumption was virtually unchalleneeable, for all
attempts to teach a uerbal language to even our
closest animal relatives, the chimpanzees, were
abysmal failures. Within the past ten years, how-
ever, researchers have discovered that it is quite
possible to teach graphic and gestural languages to
chimpanzees. Paucity of imagination alone prior
to that time forced researchers to equate lan-
guage itself with uerbal language. Within the past
"Is the chimpanzee who can ar-
ticulate an awa,reness of his
ou)n identity . ., and communi-
cate in depth with people and
with others of his ou)n hind, not
a reasonable creature in being?"
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decade, however, a number of non-verbal lan-
guages have been successfully taught to chim-
panzees, who have learned to communicate
quite admirably with their human mentors by
means of such non-verbal langllage systems and
which do satisf,v our three criteria. For example,
at the Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center
at Emory University in Atlanta, Ga., chim-
panzees have been taught a complex comput-
erized language;e at the University of Califbrnia,
Santa Barbara, other chimpanzees have mas-
tered a graphic language system based on plastic
block symbols;10 and at the Universities of'Ne-
vada and Oklahoma, chim panzees have been
taught a language. system which they' now trse to
talk to humans and even to one another, and
which is actually used by' innumerable human
beings f unctioning in human society-the Amer-
ican Sign Language for the deaf.l1 This latter
achievement is particularly important lor our
present pllrposes. Do we or do we not recognize
deaf persons as reasonable beings? i\lany of
them are certainll, unable to learn and use auer-
bal language, but deaf-mutes do successfulll' use
a gestu"ral Tanguage-the same language which
many chimpanzees are now able to use. E,ven
Descartes recognized the gestural speech of.tl-re
deaf as an instance of "real speech."l2 We are
thtrs forced to face the following dilemma: either
such deaf persons are not reasonable beings and
it is not murder willfully to kill thern; or chirn-
panzees are reasonable beir-rgs, and it is murder
to kill them. Er,en those chimpanzees which have
not actually' learned strch symbolic languages
have the potential f.or learning them, and this
alone is sufficient for recognizing a newll'-born
human infant whose umbilical cord has been
severed as a reasonable creature in being, c.z-
pable of being murdered.
We do not know as yet what the upper limit
of the developrnent of linguistic reasonableness
in chimpanzees is. We do know that the)' can
match the linguistic skills of a two-and-a-half to
three-year-old human child. Even if the skills of
a five year old turn out to be their maximum, it
would seem that our murder laws would still ap-
ply to them, for our laws do not say or pre-
suppose that murder involves the killing of a
highly reasonable creatllre in being. And we
should be very careful about introducing such
adjectives as "highly" lest we exclude our own
children from coverage by the law, and perhaps
even ourselves if the standards are set high
enough !
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Are all men reasonable creatures
in being?
It is tirne now to examine the premise that all
men are reasonable creatures in being. Are all
"human beings," as we understand the central
notion of that term, reasonable creatures in
being? Are there not some cases u'ithin a medical
context that offer little room, if anr , for debating
the question as to whether some dimension of
rationality still exists in the patient? If so, it
would seem that some valid exceptions could be
offered to the criminal statutes on homicide
being discussed here.
For example, there are presentl\. "existing"
in institutes provided for the retarded in all
states, "beings" who simply vegetate. These
"beings" cannot speak or communicate with oth-
ers. They cannot move voluntarily, cannot feed
themselr.,es. cannot sit up, and have no control
over their bou'els and bladders. They simply lie
in one position Llntil moved by an attendant. In
most instances, thel'are unable to respond to the
presence of heat or cold stimuli, or manif'est any
discernable au'areness of light. One could plau-
sibly argLre that these beings represent a very
primitive form of'biological life within a human
bodr,'. Ther definitel)' are not reasonable crea-
tures.
An even rnore primitive f orm of biological
life exists in many irreversibly comatose patients
where a patient exists without any functional
brain cortex and is permanently deprived of his
capacitl' for using langtrage. It is the absence of'
cerebral function that provides the legitimacy of
the brain-function approach to defining death.l3
Ger"reralh, in these cases, the patient's o'exis-
tence" is totalll, dependent on artificial life-sup-
port measures; however, in some instances a pa-
tient might spontaneously breathe, but this is the
extent of his self-supportive f unctions. Are these
beings, tl-re profoundly retarded and the irrever-
sibly comatose patients, reasonable creatures in
beins? And is the chirnpanzee lvho can articulate
an awareness of his own identity, express a sense
of joy and pain, and communicate in depth with
people and with others of his own kind, not a
reasonable creature in being? Because the law
does at times question the utility and appli-
cability of certain legal terminologies and rede-
fines these terms to comply with contemporary
needs, it is not unrealistic to suppose a negative
application, at some time in the future, of the
homicidal statute in question to the termination
of a profoundly retarded being's life, or the life
of an irreversibly comatose being. It would seem
that most philosophical, as well as normative,
definitions of "rationality" preclude the "beings"
in our two examples from identification as "rea-
sonable creatures in being" and would possibly
include the chimpanzees in question. We can,
perhaps, better understand the inclusion of the
words "reasonable creatllre" in defining who can
be a victim of homicide, by briefly' looking at the
historical origin of their use. In doing this, we
will see a continuing acceptance of the implica-
tion that simplr being born as Homo sapiens con-
fers "rationalitr " and status as a "reasonable
creature in being," though in fact, the intended
use of'"rationalitr'" is the other way around.
Prior to the fourteenth century, the ancient
law was consistent in holding that anyone who
procured the abortion of an u.nborn child by any
means u'as guiltv of murder if'there was, at the
time, a living fetus in utero. Obviously there
were religious or,'ertones to the court's reasoning
and up Lrntil the middle of the fourteenth cen-
turv the term "reasonable creature in being" was
not emplored.. However, the law began to recog-
nlze an lnconslstency in its position on murder-
that since there could be no homicide without a
living htrman being as the victim, the killing of
an unborn child cotrld not be murder, but in-
stead, needed to be redefined as another crime.
Thus, in order for murder to be applied, it be-
came necessan for the fetus to be born alive and
exist indeper-rdentlr as a "reasonable creature in
being."la The fettrs born alive then became the
"reasonable creatLlre in being" capable of being
murdered. -fhe basic motivating factor under-
lying the use of"'reasonable creature" was to un-
derscore the Aristotelian concept of man as a
"rational animal." and to provide for "rational-
ity" as the separatins element to be used in dis-
tinguishing man frorn animal. Whether or not
man was ln ever\ instance a "reasonable crea-
ture" at birth \\'as not considered. The implica-
tion of man as a "reasonable creature in being"
begins at the onset of' life and continues until
death occurs in the traditional sense. This impli-
cation, with the unfolding of'the psychological
and physiological ftrnctions of'the brain, is only
now beine questioned.
After the initial definition of-a "reasonable
creature in being" in the fourteenth century, the
courts continued to struggle with determining
the exact time H,hen the status of "human being"
was established. This struggle was strictly con-
fined to the newborn fetus and its ability to sur-
vive independently from its mother and not to
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any reconsideration of the implicatior-r that be ins
Homo sapiens carried with it "rationalitl'." Br mid-
nineteenth century the English cases had not
reached uniformity on whether breathine, herart
action, severance of cord, established the status
of "human being" for the purpose <-rf tl-re lau' of
homicide. In American Jurisprudent:e, mally
states adopted into their criminal codes the sarne
definition of murder given by Lord Coke in l,ng-
land, except that in England the act of nrr-rrcler is
committed "under the king's peace," where here
it is committed under the peace of the state.15 [n
coming to a decision as to when a child becontes
a "reasonable creature in being," a -['ettnessee
court ruled that a child must be born alive ancl
have an independent circulation establishecl.l6
This decision is fbllowed in those jurisdictions
still using Lord Coke's definition of'mttrder.
"While the
careful in
meaning of
haae paid
the critical
creature."'
courts haue been
interpreting the
the phrase .. . they
little attention to
words 'reasonable
While the courts have been caref ul in inter-
preting the meaning o{'the phrase "reasonuble
creature in being," the accent has been on "in being"
and they haue paid little attention to the critical it,ord.r
"reasonable creature." The broad implication of'
their meaning, as discussed, has gone for the
most part virtually unchallenged; however', the
groundwork fbr challenging the implication, at
least scientifically, is now being laid by our new
approaches to the dimensions of' rationalitr'.
American courts have examir-red the ('()n-
cept of what it is to be a "reasonable creatrrre" in
apparently only two cases.rT These cases \\'ere
decided over a century zgo, and thclugh the
court in both cases extended the meaning ol a
"reasonable creature in being" to incltrde a slar e,
a lunatic, or idiot, it does not go Llnnoticed that
an irreconcilable inconsistency in the court's rea-
soning was also created that contintres with Lrs
today-excusing the mentall1' def'ective f'rom
criminal responsibility because of the absence o{.
the element of rationality, while at the same tinre
protecting the mentally defective as "reasonable
creatures in being."
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"The law is notoriously slow to
moae or to change."
In the Mississippi case of State v.Jones, tried
in 182 I , the defendant Jones was charged with
murder in the killing of a slave.18 The court was
confronted with the question: Was a slave a rea-
sonable creature in being such that he could be
murdered? While ruling that in some respects
slaves were considered as chattels, the court held
that they were also considered in other respects
as men. The court did not define or explain in
what respects that slaves were considered as
men, but simply reasoned that since a slave could
be held responsible for homicide-the law view-
irg them as rational beings capable of com-
mitting a crime-they can be victims of murder
as rational beings, thus, they are included within
the definition of a "reasonable creature in
being."ts If the court had stopped here, the in-
consistqncy to follow would not have emerged,
and perhaps in time the criminal code would
have been amended or modified to provide for a
clearer definitive meaning of a "reasonable crea-
ture in being." However, apparently employing
the same defective reasoning, the court extend-
ed the meaning of "reasonable creatllre" to in-
clude lunatics, idiots, and unchaste women. The
latter (unchaste women) apparently provided
protection to the prostitute and unfaithful wife.
The only other case applicable to the question
being discussed is the Texas case of Perryman v.
State, which concurs with the Mississippi opin-
ion.2o
The legal inconsistency is obvious. A slave
can be charged with murder because he is a ra-
tional being, and thus he can be murdered be-
cause he is a rational being. Howeuer, a mentally
defectiue person can be murdered because he is a ratio-
nal or "reasonable creature," bltt he cannot be charged
with murder because he is not a rational being. The
law, beginning with the reports of Lord Coke's
First Institute of the Laws of England, allows
that only t.hose persons who have not a want or
defect of will are capable of committing a crime.
This theory of responsibility has been kept intact
to the present day as a viable legal doctrine. Hart
28
writes that in most contexts, the expression "he is
responsible for his actions" is employed to assert
that a person has certain normal capacities which
society associates with its concept of rationality.
The capacities in question are those of under-
standing, reasoning, and control of conduct.
They constitute the most important criteria of
moral responsibility.2l Thus, the law on one
hand established that the mentally defective is
not a rational being in order to excuse his crimi-
nal responsibility, and yet, on the other hand, al-
lows through implication that he is a "reasonable
creature ir-r being" and can be rnurdered.
est we go so far that our discussion be mis-
interpreted as calling for the death of an
"idiot," or a profbundly retarded child be-
cause he is no longer a "reasonable creature in
being," we must return to the original thesis and
intent of this paper. Are all men reasonable crea-
tures in being; and, are all reasonable creatures
in being T.n? It would seem that with. a proper
examination of the terms "reasonable" and "ra-
tional" a termination of a profbundly retarded
child's life or the life of an irreversibly comatose
patient under our murder statutes would not be
murder, while the killing of the educable chim-
panzee discussed in Section I could be consid-
ered murder. The law is notoriously slow to
move or to change; however, this fact has its
meritorious moments as well as its negative mo-
ments. Even if our courts should decide by arbi-
trary fiat that our mlrrder laws do cover the pro-
foundly retarded and the comatose human and
do not cover the chim panzee, the theoretical and
moral issues concerning "rationality" which we
have raised in this paper would still remain to be
resolved. The law is moving to digest, interpret,
and spew forth again legal guidelines for what is
happening within the new and exciting bio-ethi-
cal field. Only recently have we begun to re-ex-
amine such terms as "death," o'corpse," and
"when life begins"; and to re-define these terms
in law prompted by changes in science and medi-
cal technology and new social needs created
thereby. We are calling fbr a corresponding re-
examination of the meaning and scope of the
crucial concept of "reasonable creature." We also
call for a recognition of the fact that any law
which prof-esses explicitly or implicitll'to give le-
gal protection against murder to severely re-
tarded human beings as "reasonable creatures"
must also give equal protection to chimpanzees
with equal or superior functional abilities.
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